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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The sea has always been an important food source for the world's population and 
with the increasing awareness of the health benefits of fish, the demands placed on the 
oceans' resources continue to increase. Last year, in the United States alone, annual per 
capita seafood consumption exceeded 14 pounds (Alden, 1994). Other countries such as 
Japan, the Philippines, Cambodia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Portugal have historically out paced the U.S. per capita consumption of fish 
by at least four or five times. To meet this demand, further growth in production is 
expected. Figure 1.1 indicates the substantial rise in worldwide catch over the last 35 
years. For all U.S. fisheries, the average yearly yield from 1989 to 1991, was roughly 
6.6 million metric tons (mmt), placing the U.S. sixth in terms of total catch among fishing 
nations. In doing so, the U.S. fishing industry generated revenues of nearly $4 billion 
in 1991. This translates into tens of billions of dollars impacting the U.S. economy 
through related efforts such as ship building, the manufacture of fishing equipment, 
marketing, etc. Annual worldwide fishing revenues are estimated to be in excess of $64 
billion. In addition, a number of nations, such as Japan, Canada, Peru, Denmark, and 
Iceland, are notably dependent on foreign sales. For instance, "over 90 percent of the 
value of Iceland's exports...is fishery products." (Bell, 1978) The United States likewise 
prospers from the export market, annually exporting nearly $1 billion worth of fishery 
products to Japan alone. (Swartz and Sissenwine, 1993) 
However, this perception of limitless wealth has encouraged excessive harvesting 
of select species without thought for the long-term repercussions on the world food supply 
or on world economics. As the twentieth century draws to a close, it is now clear that 
years of uncontrolled exploitation have severely scarred the world's fishery resources. A 
number of global fish stocks have been depleted to the point where they are now in danger 
1 
Figure 1.1:    Worldwide fishery catch from 1955 to 1990.    From Sissenwine and 
Rosenberg (1993). 
of extinction. Accompanying the biological problems with common marine fisheries is 
the economic dilemmas that inevitably arise. Because of the common-property, open- 
access nature of nearly all marine stocks, fisheries tend to become economically less 
profitable as more and more effort is expended to capture additional shares of the rent. 
And though this added effort can come in a number of forms, the result is the same. The 
inefficient employment of capital and labor continues until the fishery's total cost of 
capture equals the total revenues generated from sales, and in some cases actually exceeds 
these gains. 
Of course, when such frequent situations occur, the initial reaction of the 
uninformed producer is to quickly condemn harvesting by foreign fleets or government 
intervention for the lack of profitability. In actuality, such criticisms should be directed 
within. Some form of resource ownership, via government regulations, is necessary to 
end the wasteful cycle of overcapitalization and overexploitation. Although the 
management of a highly variable a marine stock presents a complex mixture of economic, 
biological, social, and political factors, this subject has and will continue to come under 
growing pressures as the difficulties escalate. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH 
Most published evaluations of fisheries economics have argued the pros and cons 
of two contrasting systems of property rights; sole ownership verses open-access. Little 
regard has been directed to the case of limited access, and it is this omission that the 
offered text attempts to correct. This paper not only considers the economic and biological 
implications of the often used management strategies, but also studies the effects of less 
regarded tactics. Catch taxes, allocated quotas, and limited entry programs are commonly 
despised by commercial fishermen and thus given little consideration since their enactment 
is rare. Further scrutiny may reveal that these controls offer the greatest potential to 
generate significant long-run economic and biological benefits. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As already alluded to, the primary research question is to determine which, if any, 
of the fishery management schemes addressed will best serve to meet long-term economic 
and biological goals. In other words, which design will compel common-property users 
to act in an optimal manner. By optimal manner, it is implied that the most efficient 
quantity of inputs, labor and capital, are applied to the fishery. The chief objective then 
being the obtainment of the maximum economic yield (MEY). Though, the theory of 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) will also be discussed. 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Research will focus on the effects of various control measures in an attempt to 
determine the best effort reducing constraint. This paper should be considered an 
introduction to the theory of limited-entry fishery management, since many important 
complications are not discussed. In particular, only a simple deterministic model is 
provided; more complex models would involve a much more exhausting analysis. For 
simplicity purposes, many important aspects of the problem are ignored or are only given 
non-analytical commentary.   For instance, alternative objectives, stochastic influences, 
stock fluctuations and uncertainty, effects of multi-species, processing and distribution 
problems, and political factors are largely neglected. Likewise, the possibility of 
cooperation between producers (coalition building) is not considered for purposes of this 
discussion. 
Many of these limitations are evident in the following assumptions. For one, it is 
assumed that with exclusive rights to a fishery's resources, the goal of a sole-owner would 
be to maximize profits. It is also assumed that a fishery's participants, even sole-owners, 
are price takers facing a fixed and constant price; not possessing the market controls 
granted a monopolist. Similarly, the cost per unit of effort is assumed constant. With an 
indefinite time horizon, a number of proportionality assumptions are also made in 
developing the basic model. Growth and mortality rates, as well as the catch-per-unit- 
effort, are all assumed proportional to population mass. While these are the primary 
limitations and assumptions, others of lesser impact will be introduced throughout the 
course of this text. 
E.       RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A comprehensive review of the applicable literature was conducted utilizing the 
resources available from the Naval Postgraduate School (Knox) Library, the city of 
Monterey Library, and the San Diego County Library system. Information was also 
obtained from the United States Interior Department of Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
California Department of Fish and Game. Unfortunately, the information provided by 
these agencies was largely promotional and thus of little use in this economic analysis. 
Of significant importance to this text were the works of Colin W. Clark, Lee G. 
Anderson, and Fredrick W. Bell. Clark's publications, Mathematical Bioeconomics 
(1990) and Bioeconomic Modeling and Fisheries Management (1985), provided the basis 
for the fishery management models presented in Chapter 5 and 6. Anderson's edition of 
The Economics of Fisheries Management (1977) was enormously valuable in the discussion 
of the viable goals for resource management. Lastly, Bell's Food From the Sea (1978) 
provided countless examples of biological tragedy for study. 
F.        ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The organization of this text is divided into seven chapters. Chapter II offers a 
detailed look at the characteristics of common-property resources and their inherent 
problems. Also included in this section are a few illustrations of worldwide 
overexploitation and a short discussion on the role that government subsides play in the 
fishing industry. Chapter III moves into the possible objectives of fishery management 
systems, including the theories of MSY and MEY. The basic fishery model is presented 
in Chapter IV. Chapter V focuses on the unregulated economics of open-access and solely 
owned fisheries. Analytically explored are the reasons why unmanaged common-property 
resources will not operate in an optimal manner and how exclusive access rights avoid the 
inefficient use of capital and labor. The main economic evaluation of the various controls 
to restrict user effort is detailed in Chapter VI. Drawing from the discussions presented 
in Chapters IV and V, this analysis concentrates on the effects that each measure would 
have on stock preservation and, equally as important, profit generation. Chapter VII 
concludes with recommendations on the management strategies that will best serve to meet 
the long-term objectives of fishery management in the future. 

II. FISHERIES AS COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
A.       CHARACTERISTICS 
What exactly is a fishery? Many definitions abound, but Anderson (1977) probably 
says it best, ".. .a fishery can be thought of as a stock or stocks of fish and the enterprises 
that have the potential of exploiting them." Christy and Scott (1965) go on to add that "a 
BASIC characteristic of all fisheries is that they are common property natural resources." 
In fact, all wildlife stocks are common property because like many other common property 
resources, such as air, large bodies of water, and flowing streams, they can be exploited1 
by more than one enterprise at a time and without cost. In addition, since no individual 
user has to pay for the right to use the resource, no single enterprise has exclusive rights 
to the wealth; nor can lawfully prevent other units from sharing in the bounty. 
Under such circumstances, overutilization2 of the fishery becomes a common 
occurance. Distinct from industries where private property rights prevail, a producer's 
productivity in the fishing industry is influenced by the total number of economic units 
exploiting the common resource. When left unregulated in this environment, producers 
will attempt to gain a greater share of the product resulting in overfishing and the eventual 
collapse of the fishery. As Clark (1980) notes, "the tragedy of the commons has proved 
particularly difficult to counteract in the case of marine fishery resources, where the 
establishment of individual property rights is virtually out of the question." One reason 
1
 The term exploitation as used in the course of this text does not, in itself, infer misuse, but rather the 
utilization of a common property resource. 
2
 The terms overutilization and overexploitation are used to denote that the level of fishing has exceeded the 
resource's productivity. When fully utilized/exploited a balance between the fishing level and resource productivity 
has been achieved. 
private use rights are not established is that the expense for their defense is deemed to be 
more costly than the added returns. Thus, public ownership is a rudimentary fact that will 
continue to influence the economics of fishery management for a long time to come. (Bell, 
1978) 
B.       ECONOMIC AND CONSERVATION INEFFICIENCY 
Another unique attribute of a common property resource, such as a fishery stock, 
is the fact that the amount of fishing effort applied is not subject to the same constraints 
that regulate the use of a solely owned resource. The optimum input levels of labor and 
capital applied to privately owned resources, such as farmlands and coal mines, are not 
applied to fisheries. Since the commercial users of a common fishery are in physical 
competition with one another, when left unchecked, they will continue to increase their 
effort to maximize their share of available resources, so long as profit can be gained.3 
Thus, it is unlikely that individual users will self-impose one-sided constraints to 
limit their effort in hopes of achieving a greater social good; knowing that other producers 
would eagerly reap the unharvested resources. Moreover, there is no limit on the number 
of producers who can participate in an unregulated fishery. As additional speculators enter 
the market (i.e., the level of fishing effort increases), the marginal and average catch per 
unit of effort declines until all profit has been dissipated. "With such conditions, with 
demand increasing, and without controls, it is inevitable that the fishery will not only 
become depleted but also that the exploration of the fishery will become economically 
inefficient in its use of labor and capital." (Christy and Scott, 1965) 
The reason that these economic and biological inefficiencies develop is the fact that 
commercial fishermen using public resources "...fail to take into account the costs that 
their use may impose on other users." (Clark, 1990) Users of these common resources 
A technical analysis of the economic shortcomings of unregulated fisheries is presented in Chapter 5. 
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do not make the most efficient use of labor, capital, and the fishery resource. As a result, 
national incomes are depressed by diverting valuable resources into unproductive pursuits. 
Typically accompanying the problem of overutilization is overcapitalization, which occurs 
when the available resource is exceeded by the harvesting capacity. An expected result 
of unrestricted participation in fisheries, overcapitalization intensifies the economic woes 
and in turn escalates the pressure to continue overutilization and resource depletion. 
C.       HISTORY OF EXPLOITATION 
Although many inhabitants of the world have long perceived the oceans as 
boundless sources of virtually inexhaustible resources, it is now evident to most that these 
common resources are unprotected from an overabundance of fisherman with little 
propensity for maintaining sustainable stock yields. History has been remarkably 
consistent in that common fish stocks are inevitably overexploited, frequently to the point 
of collapse or extinction. Unfortunately, overexploitation is often undetectable until it is 
severe and often irreversible. Of the fisheries the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization evaluates, over 40 percent are described as heavily exploited or entirely 
depleted (Swartz and Sissenwine, 1993). The National Marine Fisheries Service calculates 
that at least 45 percent of all U.S. fisheries are currently overfished (Holmes, 1994). 
Several major fisheries around the world have been depleted or have completely 
collapsed largely because of overfishing, though in some cases environmental factors also 
played a role. A prime example of overharvesting is that of the California sardine. 
Gulland (1977) discusses the 1936/37 season, when vast fishing fleets once operated out 
of Monterey and sardines were one of the biggest fisheries in the world, with a peak catch 
that year of 800,000 tons. The then California Division of Fish and Game (CDFG) issued 
alerts at the time that the sardine fishery was being overexploited and in danger of 
collapse. They advocated that annual quotas be established. This was opposed by the 
fishing industry, which used its own scientists to dispute the CDFG's findings.   As a 
result, no action was taken to protect the stock. By 1952 the catch was almost nonexistent, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.1. To this day, the U.S. Pacific coastal sardine stock remains 
at a comparably low level. (Ludwig, et al., 1993) 
800    -r 
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Figure 2.1:  Sardine catches off the Pacific coast of the United States.  After Gulland 
(1977). 
After the decimation of the California sardine, the vast fishing fleets moved south, 
targeting the Peruvian anchovy. "The result was the most specular collapse in the history 
of fisheries exploitation: the yield decreased from a high of [over] 10 million metric tons 
to near zero in a few years." (Ludwig, et al., 1993) Once the largest single-species fishery 
in the world, Peruvian anchovy fishery saw production drop from 12.3 million metric tons 
(mmt) in 1970 to less than 2 mmt by 1973. Within three years, production was off 85 
percent from peak levels. However, in defense of the fishing industry, the destruction of 
the anchovy fishery was a combination of overexploitation and oceanographic phenomena. 
Specifically, the El Nino currents prompted large fish kills and pushed fish deeper into the 
sea, where capture is much more demanding. (Bell, 1978) 
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Other stocks to have been depleted as a result of overfishing include some of the 
United States' most valuable fishery resources, in particular the North Pacific albacore, 
Pacific perch, Atlantic menhaden, Atlantic swordfish, Atlantic bluefin tuna, Atlantic sea 
scallop, New England cod, haddock, and flounder, and many varieties of oyster, clam, 
and abalone. Figure 2.2 illustrates the exploitation of the New England groundfish, one 
of the most heavily fished fisheries in the world. Additional stocks like the California 
sardine and Alaskan rockfish, are no longer considered overutilized, but their populations 
are below the levels required to generate their long-term potential yields.4 In the future, 
such problems are likely to become more critical as demand for food fish increases and 
as location, catch, and distribution technologies improve. (Swartz and Sissenwine, 1993) 
— Abundanc« 
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Figure 2.2: The total harvest of groundfish (cod, haddock, flounder, and others) and their 
total abundance. After Holmes (1994). 
D.       SUBSIDIZED EXPLOITATION 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has also concluded that 
fishing expenses are annually exceeding revenues by $16 billion (Sissenwine and 
4
 The long-term potential yield is the maximum yield that could be taken, year after year, if the fishing effort 
is fixed at a point where the stock population generates the greatest growth. 
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Rosenberg, 1993). This deficit occurs because of the overcapitalization of most fisheries 
today. The incentive is for more and larger vessels to quickly capture a limited amount 
of fish, to the point where for most investors, fishing is now a losing proposition. 
So why does the industry persist in overemploying capital and labor in an 
unprofitable enterprise rather than disinvesting? In many instances, governments 
ultimately fund the export of fishery products to delay the unemployment that results 
when resources become extremely diminished or production becomes prodigal. 
Unfortunately, added investment in vessels and processing capacity is often encouraged 
with a run of a few productive years, but when conditions return to normal, the same 
industry that spurns government intervention appeals for help. Such solicitation, usually 
with considerable investments and many jobs at risk, often preys on the emotions of the 
public, which perceive that resources and jobs are being lost to foreign competitors. 
(Ludwig, et al., 1993) 
The standard response by any government is to provide massive amounts of 
financial support. The United States, for example, has regularly provided relief in the 
form of low interest loans, credit guarantees, construction subsidies, and federal income 
tax deferrals to common property fishery users. However, the U.S. is not alone in these 
anticompetitive practices, where large subsidies are granted to one nation's industry, but 
not to others having to compete in the same world market. Many nations with market- 
oriented economies, such as Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom, have traditionally 
provided more financial assistance to their commercial fishing industries than the United 
States. And though these subsidies may originally be deemed temporary, governments go 
to great lengths to out subsidize rival fishing nations, thereby contributing even more to 
the problem. These governmental policies are in effect encouraging overharvesting and 
overcapitalization; thus diminishing the resource base. Before any regulatory control can 
be effectively implemented, such practices must be halted. (Bell, 1978) 
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HI. FISHERY MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 
With an understanding for the importance of the oceans' resources and an 
awareness of the economic and environmental problems facing common property 
resources, it is easy to see why some form of fishery management would be necessary. 
But before addressing the means of regulating fisheries, the objective of these controls 
needs to be considered. All too frequently, regulatory agencies attempt to curb the 
problems associated with public fisheries without a clear understanding for the purpose to 
be served. A majority of the fishery management programs today reflect the accumulated 
effects of fragmented retreats from sound management practices in the face of growing 
pressures from commercial users and conservationists. 
The two principle (most frequently discussed) objectives of the fishery management 
community are variants of the theory of maximum production from the seas. The first, 
for years advocated by marine biologists, is that fisheries should attempt to maximize their 
long-term contribution to the world food supply. The second, endorsed by economists, 
is that the value of the ocean's resources in excess of utilization costs should be 
maximized. The first goal thereby accentuates the physical volume of production, while 
the second highlights the importance of the economic rent associated with the oceans' 
exploitation. However, many scientists that support the physical goal now realize that 
policy decisions must also consider economic considerations; vigorously opposing 
conservation strategies that have no clear economic basis. 
A.       MAXIMUM SUSTAINED YIELD 
The scant number of fisheries which currently strive to meet some renewable 
resource objective, have traditionally based their goals on the concept of maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). Though also referred to as the optimum sustainable yield (OSY) 
in some texts, by either name, its design is to secure the maximum long-term potential 
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yield from the sea. The basic concept of MSY suggests that the level of catch can be 
sustained indefinitely if offset, along with natural mortality, by the growth of new fish. 
Thus, it follows that if the level of effort is constant, the greatest physical yield that a 
stock can produce year after year is achieved at the population level where the growth rate 
is greatest.5 For most fishery stock, the MSY equilibrium is between 40 and 60 percent 
of their environmental carrying capacity. (Clark, 1990) 
By increasing the fishing intensity beyond the point of MSY, i.e., overutilizing the 
common property resource, the physical yield would annually decline. This occurs, 
because more and more users, expending a greater effort, are sharing fewer and fewer 
resources. The Gordon-Schaefer yield curve, illustrated in Figure 3.1, demonstrates how 
production is affected by an increase in the fishing magnitude beyond the level sustaining 
the maximum output. Likewise, at these high levels of effort, the growth rate is not able 
to compensate for the degree of fishing. As a result, the stock population dwindles. 
The concept of maximum sustainable yield has some obvious advantages. It 
provides a very simple and easily understood picture of how fishing effort and fishery 
stock relate. Any commercial user or law-making body should be able to comprehend that 
small stock populations supply small yields, and with a little further explanation, that only 
small yields can be taken from big stocks without long-term depletion. Those who still 
advocate MSY as a viable goal for fishery management, do so for other reasons as well. 
Some insist that the oceans' resources are nearly inexhaustible and therefore should be 
utilized as a substitute for scarce land resources. Others envision that large demands for 
food in the future necessitate the utmost exploitation of the seas. (Gulland, 1977) 
5
  Swartz and Sissenwine (1993) estimate that the MSY all U.S. fisheries is approximately 9.5 mmt, or about 
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Figure 3.1:  Total revenues, costs, and sustainable yield with respect to effort.  After 
Christy and Scott (1965). 
For many years, the concept of maintaining resource levels at their MSYs guided 
fishery management. However, there is now widespread agreement that this concept is 
no longer acceptable, for various biological and socioeconomic reasons. It is evident that 
the axiom is far too simplistic to function as a sound operational goal in administering 
most living resource stocks. McHugh (1984) notes that the MSY concept has at least two 
basic biological weaknesses which make it difficult to apply in real world situations. For 
one, many, if not all, renewable resource stocks are subject to wide and unpredictable 
natural fluctuations. Marine stocks do not behave in a simple way. Thus, the MSY 
cannot be precisely determined nor, for that matter, be represented by a single value. 
Yields that can be safely taken when stock levels are high may not be sustained at lower 
populations. McHugh (1984) also notes stock species are not independent of other stocks. 
Recruitment rates and the effects of fishing a particular stock, which can be gauged 
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explicitly under controlled laboratory conditions, may not be accurate assessments for the 
natural and dynamic environment. Modification of the MSY concept would be required 
to account for such uncertainties and variations. 
As significant as these biological arguments are against MSY, the strongest 
objections come from economists. They maintain that the attainment of the maximum 
physical yield makes no economic sense. The concept is clearly addressed solely for the 
benefits of resource exploitation and completely ignores the cost considerations. Near the 
maximum of the Schaefer curve, in Figure 4.1, the yield only marginally increases with 
additional increases in effort. The added effort required to catch the last few fish costs 
many more times the average cost. These resources could be better used elsewhere. 
Indeed, pursuing the MSY of a single stock would reduce a producer's total fish yield in 
comparison with what could be captured with the same effort, but by better balancing 
between heavily and less heavily utilized stocks. There is no logical connection between 
the largest possible physical catch and the catch that is most economically desirable. 
(Gulland, 1997) 
In light of these shortcomings, very few marine scientists now defend the MSY 
concept as the ideal theoretical guide to renewable resource management. Nevertheless, 
in practice this philosophy can still be functional. If employed as a constraint on 
exploitation vice an optimal level of capture, the concept may indeed possess worthy 
elements. As noted earlier, on numerous occasions the commercial fishing effort has 
surpassed the level yielding the maximum sustained product. This leads to significant 
depletion of the biological resource as the stock is reduced far below the MSY. When this 
occurs, the MSY concept may provide the industry with a good and easily grasped rallying 
point to lessen the level of effort. (Clark, 1990; McHugh, 1984) 
Management tactics rooted exclusively in achieving the maximum physical yield 
will almost certainly breed severe crises because of the concept's economic irrelevance. 
With a reduction of fishing to the MSY level, the waste of resources such as money, 
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vessels, and men that might be more productive if used elsewhere, will persist. However, 
the theory does move the effort level in depleted fisheries in the correct direction. Current 
debates are now concerned with specifying some effort/population level, to the left of the 
point of MSY in Figure 3.1, that will provide the greatest good in an economic sense. 
B.       MAXIMUM ECONOMIC YIELD 
Economic studies have long proposed the substitution of the maximum sustainable 
yield with the maximum net economic yield as the proper aim of fishery management. 
The basic difference between the purely biological theory of the maximum sustainable 
physical yield and the maximum sustainable economic yield is that the former considered 
only the resource population, whereas the true goal of management should be to provide 
the greatest benefit to man. The concept of MEY dictates that the economic rent, the 
difference between revenues and costs, of the individual users and the net contribution of 
the fishery to the economy should be maximized. (McHugh, 1984) 
Economists advance the idea that to efficiently use labor and capital, the level of 
catch should equal the point of rent maximization; a total catch below the point of MSY. 
The maximum net economic revenue is identified by extending the total cost curve, as seen 
in Figure 4.1, to a point of tangency with the production function. In this illustration, the 
assumption is that the cost function is linear and runs through the origin, which is rarely 
the case. But regardless of the cost curve's representation, the advantages of providing 
higher rent are the same: better profit for the users, cheaper fish for the consumers, and 
less governmental aid. (McHugh, 1984; Bell, 1978) 
This is the principal justification for adopting MEY as the capture quantity for 
optimum management. However, such a restriction has scientific and biological 
advantages, as well. The maximum physical output occurs at a high level of effort where 
the yield curve is flat; the point of maximum profit occurs at a lower level of effort 
where the yield curve slopes more steeply. Thus, better information may be available to 
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marine scientists for determining the catch consistent with MEY, than to determine the 
catch providing the MSY. Likewise, holding the catch at a level below maximum physical 
output provides conservationists with a safety factor against the unpredictable stock 
fluctuations that could lead to overfishing. (Gulland, 1977) 
While the objective of rent-maximization is not open to many of the same criticisms 
leveled against the goal of maximum physical yield, there are several difficulties associated 
with its achievement. For one, it has been denounced by Clark (1985) because of the 
imprecision in determining the opportunity cost of capital. The concept has also been 
attacked because it hinges on the unit cost of the fishing effort and the price of the fish 
captured. These values can vary from year to year and from nation to nation. Hence, the 
concept does not furnish a permanently fixed level of effort for determining management 
action. (Gulland, 1977) 
Still another difficulty of using net economic yield as an objective lies in the 
transition of producers already excessively utilizing labor and capital. To achieve a 
maximum economic rent, some of the surplus elements of production would have to be 
eliminated. For instance, it may be necessary to reduce the number of vessels exploiting 
the common property resource by a large percentage. From an economics perspective, 
society may be better off because of improved efficiency, but the social and political 
hardships, even though transitional, may be difficult to shoulder. Nevertheless, the 
concept of MEY would promote the movement of producer effort in the optimum 
economic direction. (Christy and Scott, 1965) 
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IV. FISHERY MODEL 
Now with some idea of the viable objectives of fishery management, a model 
reflecting the relationship between fishing effort and other variables is needed in order to 
make sound predictions. Specifically, a model is needed to determine how resource 
populations and profits are affected by changes in the effort level. Likewise, the effects 
of possible management actions, such as constraints on the amount of fishing, sizes of fish 
caught, or number of speculators exploiting the resource can also be measured. In fact, 
a wide range of conceivable ventures can be evaluated. If the model is effective, the 
predicted outcomes will correspond closely to the actual events. However, given the 
complexities of any natural system, such as a fish stock, and the myriad of unknowns that 
might affect it, no model can present an entirely accurate prediction of future events. The 
chief requirement of a model in the course of this text is that it should provide a 
reasonably accurate assessment of alternative management actions. 
A.       BASIC BIOLOGIC MODEL 
The ensuing model, a composite of the works of Clark (1990), Clark (1985), 
Gulland (1977), and Anderson (1977), consists of a series mathematical expressions which 
represent the biological phenomena occurring in fisheries worldwide. By treating the fish 
population as a unit, considering only changes in total biomass without regard for its 
structure (age, composition, etc.), the model remains relatively basic.   Its equations are 
— =G(x)-h(x), x(0)=xQ, (4.1) 
dt 
h(t)=q'E(t)-x(t), (42> 
x(t) > 0, (4.3) 
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Tl(x(t),E(t)) = p-h(t)  - cE(t) = \p-q-x(t)-cYE(t), (44) 
0
 * £« * EMAX> (4-5) 
where the notation is defined as: 
x(t) = fish population mass at time t, 
G(x) = net growth function, 
h(t) = harvest (catch) rate, 
E(t) = fishing effort, 
q = catchability coefficient, 
p = sale price of fish, 
c = cost of effort, 
7i(x(t),E(t)) = profit. 
The various parameters are assumed to be known. 
1. Growth 
The natural growth function is also assumed to satisfy the following: 
G(0)  = G{K) = 0, G{x) > 0 when    0 < x < K (4.6) 
where K denotes the environmental carrying capacity (natural biomass equilibrium). This 
can be deduced by assuming that the both the birth rate (b) and the natural mortality rate 
(m) are proportional to the population mass (x) at each stock level. This is a reasonable 
assumption. Also assuming, for the moment, that there is no harvesting (h(t)=0), then 
the production function in Equation 4.1 can be rewritten as 
— = G(x)-0 = (b-m)-x = r-x, ^ j^ 
dt 
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where r denotes the net proportional growth rate. Solving this differential equation yields 
■dx =   Irdt I- J x 
\nx  = r-t 
„ in x   _   „ rt e        - e 
x(t)  = e n (4-8) 
Thus, over time the biomass level would grow to an infinite size, if the net proportional 
growth rate was positive (r>0), or approach zero if it was negative (r <0). Clearly, this 
is not the case; many biological factors inhibit infinite movement. As stock levels 
increase, environmental limitations force the rate of growth to decline. Consequently, 
Equation 4.8 can be altered 
— = r(x)-x where     r(x)  = -^ (4.9) 
dt x 
to reflect that the intrinsic growth rate is some decreasing function of the population mass. 
(Clark, 1990; Clark, 1985; Gulland, 1977) 
For a specific example, Clark (1990) uses the logistics population equation 
developed by P.F. Verhulst in 1838, when r(x)=r (1-x/K), Equation 4.9 becomes 
— = r-x-{\ -—) = G(x). (4.10) 
dt K 
Remembering the assumption of zero harvest, explicitly solving this differential equation 
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 + 1 
(4.11) 
Equation 4.11 determined the limit condition such that K is the saturation level 
LIM   x(t) = K when   r > 0. (4.12) 
The implication is that if the stock population is greater than zero but less than the 
carrying capacity (0<x<K), the change in stock with respect to time is positive 
(dx/dt>0) until a growth balance (b=m) is reached. (Clark, 1990; Clark, 1985; Gulland, 
1977) 
The relationship between the rate of growth and the stock level is depicted in 




Population Abundance (x) 
Figure 4.1: Relationship between the growth function and population. From Clark (1990). 
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Limiting Population Carrying Capacity 
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Time 
Figure 4.2: Growth of a fish population in a limiting environment. After Gulland (1977). 
2. Harvesting 
Equation 4.1 states that the biomass of a renewable resource will tend to increase 
(dx/dt>0) whenever the natural growth rate exceeds the harvesting capacity. Of course, 
the reverse is also true. If, however, the growth rate is matched by the rate of removal, 
the stock population maintains a sustainable level. In other words, there corresponds a 
catch rate that balances new growth at each stock level and therefore establishes an 
equilibrium position. When this equivalency occurs, a sustainable yield can be captured 
while preserving a fixed population level. However, this is not necessarily the maximum 
yield. 
By subjecting the stock population to fishing and, for simplicity, holding the 
harvesting capacity to a constant (h(t) = h), Equation 4.10 can be written as 
dt 
= G(x)-h(t)  = r-x'iX-—)  - h. 
K. 
(4.13) 
If the removal rate exceeds the maximum rate of growth (h > max G(x)), as it does in 
Figure 4.3, the population level will approach zero over time for any initial population. 
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If, on the other hand, the harvest rate is less than the maximum growth rate (0 < h < 
max G(x)), as it is in Figure 4.4, then there exists two equilibrium positions, x, and x2. 
If the initial mass lies between these points (xt < x(0) < %), then the stock level will 
converge to the x2 equilibrium point as the rate of new growth out paces the rate of 
fishing. Likewise, if the initial population is greater than x2, the biomass will converge 
to the x2 where the rates of new growth and removal balance. Lastly, if the initial stock 
is less than xu then the population will approach zero as harvesting continues to deplete 




Figure 4.3:   Logistics model with constant harvest rate h > max G(x).   After Clark 
(1990). 
When maximum growth and removal equate (h = max G(x)), there exists a lone 
equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 4.5. If peak growth occurs at 50 percent of the 
environmental carrying capacity, then x3 = K/2. Initial stock levels greater than this value 
(x(0) > x3) will converge to this equilibrium point. But initial masses less than this 









Figure 4.5: Logistics model with constant harvest rate h = max G(x). 
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3. Fishing Effort 
The level of effort within a fishery can be measured or defined in a variety of ways 
(e.g., the total number of vessels per day, the volume of seawater screened by fishing gear 
per hour, etc.). Regardless of the measure, this model assumes the catch-per-unit-effort 
is proportional to the population level, as indicated in Equation 4.2. Rewriting Equation 
4.1 to reflect this proportionality yields 
dv x 
— = r-x-{\-—)  - q-E(t)-x(t). (4.14) 
dt                     K 
With a fixed level of effort and a removal rate that does not exceed the net proportional 
growth rate (qE < r), one unique nonzero equilibrium exists at 




Furthermore, any initial stock level converges to this equilibrium, as seen in Figure 4.6, 
given the aforementioned assumption. Corresponding to this level of effort, the 
equilibrium harvest, or sustainable yield (Y), is given by 
Y(E) = h  = q-x4 = q-E'K-{\-^-). <416> 
r 
However, if removal surpasses new growth (qE > r), then the stock level is driven to zero 
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Figure 4.6: Logistics model with constant rate of effort (E).   After Clark (1990). 
B.       BASIC ECONOMIC MODEL 
The basic economic model is represented essentially by Equation 4.4. According 
to Clark (1980), the bionomic equilibrium6 in an open-access fishery is the population 
mass at which a fishery's profit becomes zero. Although, as noted in Chapter II, some 
fisheries are experiencing a negative profit. Nevertheless, assuming that the cost per unit 
of effort and the price of fish are constant, the equilibrium biomass level can be 




Equation 4.17 suggests, as expected, that lower cost to price ratios result in relatively 
more severe stock depletions and subsequently lower stock levels. Hence, to the achieve 
the MEY, the population mass should be adjusted from the initial biomass (x(0)) to the 
optimal biomass (x*) as swiftly as possible by altering the fishing effort accordingly. 
(Clark, 1985) 
6
 First used in The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery by H.S. Gordon's (1954), 
the term bionomic equilibrium describes a level determined by both biological and economic parameters. 
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V. UNREGULATED FISHERY ECONOMICS 
A.       SOLE-OWNER EFFORT 
If the utilization of a fish stock is carried out by a single economic unit, it is 
reasonable to assume that the sole-owner's goal is to maximize profits from the fishery. This 
is exceptionally convenient, since the chief interest in determining whether to modify the 
level of effort would then be the marginal yield. For instance, if the cost of a unit of effort, 
including the opportunity cost of investing in some other activity, is less than the marginal 
gain, then added effort would be economically desirable. This additional effort could come 
in a number of forms, including investment in new and faster trawlers, improved capturing 
equipment, more labor, etc. Similarly, if the cost of a unit of effort exceeds the marginal 
gain, then increasing the fishing magnitude would be undesirable. 
A sole-owner would have the ability to control the level of effort within a particular 
fishery, but not to control the market price as with a monopolist. This distinction is 
important. Market competition typically betters social welfare, but uncontrolled competition 
for common resources does not. It is also assumed that the sole-owner is pursuing long-term 
profits and not seeking a quick depletion of the resource (cashing out). Given these 
assumptions, the long-term stock equilibrium giving the maximum net economic return is 
simply x(t) = x\ where x* is the unique maximum solution to first derviative of Equation 
4.4. Under single ownership, the optimal harvest policy would be the effort that drives 
the initial stock population to x* as quickly as possible. This rate can be expressed in 
terms of both effort, as in Equation 5.1, and harvesting, as in Equation 5.2, 
E\t) =     /    GOT)       ,,WA . (5.1) 
E 
max // x{i) > x * 
CO ifx(t) = x* 
qx 
0 if x(t) < x * 
29 
h if x(t) > x * 
max J      v ' 
(5-2) 
h*(t) }   G(x*)       ifx(t) = x* 
0 // x(t) < x * 
where E^ represents the maximum capacity available to the owner and hmax denotes the 
maximum achievable capture rate. Simply put, a profit maximizing sole-owner would 
harvest at the greatest rate achievable when the stock population is above the MEY level; 
and completely refrain from harvesting if the biomass is below this level. Once the stock 
reaches the point of MEY, it would be maintained by matching the removal and 
recruitment rates. (Clark, 1985) 
B.        OPEN-ACCESS EFFORT 
1. Basic Economics 
Very few fish stocks are exploited by a single enterprise; most are subject to open 
and uncontrolled access. A continuing theme throughout this text has been the grave 
consequences of this open-access exploitation. As noted in Chapter H, the tendency of a 
common property fishery, in the absence of any economic restraint on effort, is to become 
depleted and economically unprofitable. Operating as individuals, each user seeks to 
maximize the difference between revenues and costs. But because there are no constraints 
on the number of producers that can enter the fishery nor on the amount of capital and 
labor that can be injected, any true profit will attract additional speculators and/or greater 
effort. Consequently, over the long-run, the value of the catch will approach the cost of 
catching it. 
A simple model of this uncontrolled exploitation is depicted by the Gordon- 
Schaefer parabolic yield-effort curve in Figure 5.1. Recalling from Chapter IV, each point 
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on the curve corresponds to the sustainable yield resulting from a given effort. Assuming 
a fixed price and a cost, constant and proportional to the level of effort expended, the total 
sustainable revenue and total cost functions can be represented by 
TR  =p-Y(E) (5.3) 
TC = cE (5.4) 
Subsequently, the sustainable economic rent, or profit, function can be expressed as 
71 = TR  - TC = p-Y(E)  - cE = pqEK'(\ -^-)  - cE (5<5) 
And similar to the determination of the bionomic stock equilibrium calculated in Equation 
4.17, the equilibrium effort level in an open-access fishery can be solved by setting the 
profit function to zero. When all economic rent has been dissipated, the effort equilibrium 
can be expressed as 
71 = pqEK-(\ -$£-)  - cE = 0 
r 




If the biological elements are known, then the effort equilibrium becomes a function of the 
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Figure 5.1: Bionomic equilibrium in an open-access fishery. From Clark (1985). 
Thus far, the focus as has been on the more interesting low cost to price ratio, as 
displayed by curve TCL in Figure 5.2, but this is not always the case. In fact, as with so- 
called trash fish, the fishing costs are sufficiently high compared to the stock's market 
value that the fishery is not exploited (TCH). Equally conceivable is an effort equilibrium 
in which the resource is exploited but at a biomass below the point of MSY (TCM). In this 
case, biological overfishing is avoided, but rents are still zero. Clearly, the more valuable 
the stock relative to the capture cost, the more intensively it will be depleted under open- 




Figure 5.2: Equilibrium levels at different cost-price ratios. After Clark (1985). 
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VI. REGULATED FISHERY ECONOMICS 
Previous chapters examined many features of open-access, common-property 
resources to explain the phenomena of biological and economic overexploitation. A model 
was presented to predict the utilization patterns of private resource owners, in an attempt 
to identify the attributes of optimal exploitation practices. One conclusion drawn from this 
analysis holds true for all fisheries: with free and open access exists and increasing product 
demand, a fishery will inevitably induce excessive amounts of labor and capital, eventually 
to the point of economic inefficiency. It seems clear that some system for regulating free 
and open-access is needed to avert the misuse of these resources. 
However, if fishery management betters the social and economic well-being of its 
users, why do controls have to be imposed and enforced? Should not fishermen willfully 
adopt such restraints making the fishery self-regulating? This overlooks one important 
point: the decision to maximize economic yields must be made collectively. No individual 
user would limit his or her production rate unless all other users took the same measures. 
Since the level of effort exploiting an unregulated fish stock continues to grow until there 
is no longer an economic incentive for further expansion, lone restraint means loss of 
harvest not deferment. Furthermore, the development of a coalition, even if it could get 
full and honest participation, would not generate profits because of the fishery's open 
nature. 
It has also been claimed that governments should not enhance the profits of select 
industries. However, those putting forth this argument not only fail to fully realize the 
considerable economic benefits accruing to society as a whole, but also the severity of the 
potential losses in the absence of fishery management. Some regulatory action is often 
needed to prevent economic disaster. Although there may be some powerful arguments 
against too much management, the problems resulting from inaction have been repeated 
throughout this text. The only comparison that needs to be made is between the outcomes 
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of particular actions, and that of inaction to see why management can be more effective 
in achieving both stock conservation and profit generation. 
Unfortunately, the variety of controls traditionally applied to fisheries is impressive 
in number only. Overly zealous administrators have found ways to restrict virtually every 
facet of the fishery operations. Common are constraints affecting vessel type, dimensions, 
horsepower, and tonnage; equipment type, size, and construction; time and place of 
fishing; species, size, and amount of fish captured; and processing plant capacity. 
However, little if any economic analysis went into developing most of these methods of 
fishery management; all of which are prevalent today. Historically, management strategies 
have rarely considered their complete economic ramifications. Rather, they have emerged 
almost exclusively from a biological context. Although these techniques have occasionally 
proved successful for long-term conservation, they provide few, if any, economic 
advantages. 
The list of the fishery management restrictions to be economically assessed is 
lengthy, but by no means exhaustive. 
1. Citizenship restrictions: limiting access based on nationality. 
2. Vessel and gear constraints: physical properties of vessels (dimensions, tonnage, 
horsepower, etc.) or of fishing equipment (type, size, number of nets, traps, etc.). 
3. Time and place restrictions: seasonal or area closures. 
4. Financial disincentives: taxes or royalties on catch or on fishing effort. 
5. License limitations: licensing a restricted number of fishermen or vessels. 
6. Total quotas: total allowable catch quantities by species and area. 
7. Allocated quotas: catch quantities are allocated to individual fishing enterprises. 
Other control measures include vessel ownership restrictions, trip limits, quality and 
handling restraints, and type-catch controls. 
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In addition to a fixed price and cost of unit effort, there are three principal 
assumptions underlying this attempt to gauge the economic implications of various 
management designs. For one, the resource will continue to be utilized under conditions 
of pure competition after implementing regulatory controls. In other words, the fish stock 
remains common-property, but not necessarily open-access if the number of producers is 
restrained. Secondly, the resource in question must largely lie within the jurisdiction of 
a single nation, which can therefore advance the same authority over all parties. And 
lastly, the primary objective of fishery management is to achieve the MEY. But since the 
main purpose is to discuss how regulation can affect efficiency in the production of effort, 
very little insight will be lost with this assumption. 
A. MAGNUSON FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 
Throughout most of history, common-property fish stocks have been basically 
uncontrolled, with the exception of a few limits on size, area, and season. It was not until 
the mid to late 1960s that the U.S. fishing industry and the general public began to 
recognize the need for more fishery management. By this time large factory trawlers from 
Asia and Europe had begun regularly fishing off the North American coast, often with the 
intention of quickly depleting the resource before venturing on. With the enactment of the 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the United States expanded its 
authority over fishery stocks from 12 to 200 miles offshore. Enthusiastically supported 
by the U.S. fishing industry, the legislation's purpose was to end the overutilization of 
fishery resources, which was chiefly blamed on foreign fleets, and to encourage U.S. 
producers to expand operations. (Sissenwine and Rosenberg, 1993) 
Ironically however, by extending the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the U.S. 
"traded overfishing by once-dominant foreign fleets for domestic overcapitalization 
throughout the country and overfishing in some regions." (Swartz and Sissenwine, 1993) 
Other than perhaps the makeup (nationality) of the participants involved, recent studies by 
scientists at the National Marine Fisheries Service indicate that relatively little change in 
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the utilization of coastal U.S. fish stocks has occurred in the post Magnuson Act era. 
Although, the legislation failed to account for the economic incentives of the U.S. fleet and 
thus was largely inadequate in ending the chronic overutilization problems, it did serve to 
put 90 percent of the value of U.S. exploited fisheries in the hands of a single jurisdiction. 
This consummate control continues to play a crucial role in the enactment and enforcement 
of other regulatory measures.  (MacKenzie, 1987) 
B.       PHYSICAL CONTROLS 
The oldest forms of management are directed exclusively towards biological 
conservation of fish stocks, by employing physical constraints that limit the time and place 
of fishing and/or the type of gear that can be used. These regulations serve to increase the 
costs of producing effort or, at the very least, to prevent a reduction in fishing costs. 
Time and gear restrictions do not result in an optimal use of fishing effort, but rather a 
regulated inefficiency. Prohibiting technologically efficient gear or causing common- 
property users to fish at accelerated rates over a shortened seasons only serves to make 
fishing a more costly endeavor for the fishermen, not a profitable one. 
Simply put, the affect of placing constraints on the way inputs can be used in open- 
access fishery operations is to cause the cost curve to shift upwards, intersecting the 
revenue function at a lower level of effort. However, producing this regulated effort level 
in a shorter time period or with limited equipment causes the unit cost of its production 
to raise from CR to C'R , as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Where the new total cost curve 
intersects the revenue curve, the fishery converges to a regulated bionomic equilibrium in 
which net economic yield again approaches zero. The end result is that the open-access 
equilibrium level of effort is reduced, but only through the indirect effect of greater total 
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Figure 6.1:  Physical controls reduce the open-access level of effort by increasing unit 
costs through forced inefficiencies. After Anderson (1977). 
There are additional aspects to the problem of physical controls that should be 
noted. Prohibiting fishing in particular areas or during certain times of the year can 
simply cause common-property users to expand their effort in other areas and/or at 
different times, at a higher cost. This is especially true if the targeted stock is available 
throughout the year or over many regions. Likewise, there are no assurances that the 
excluded labor and capital will be shifted to some underutilized fishery, or into an 
altogether different segment of the economy. If the released labor and gear remains idle 
or is shifted into to an already overexploited market, then regulatory action could be 
counterproductive. Other considerations include the effect on consumption; if fresh fish 
is available for only short durations, more of the capture would have to be frozen for off- 
season use. All regulatory programs must constantly weigh such relative gains and loses 
to determine whether a net economic or social benefit would result. (Bell, 1978) 
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Another problem with equipment controls is that producers often uncover 
improvements to circumvent the regulations, given time to adjust. Consequently, total 
costs would fall and the effort level expand. Further controls would have to be continually 
enacted in order to maintain effort at specified levels. In summary, the imposed 
inefficiencies may increase the economy's well-being, but this does not often happen. 
When it does occur, the economy is still not operating efficiently. Further gains in social 
welfare are always possible if proper regulations remove, vice inflict, inefficiencies. It 
is also obvious that escalating the expense of fishing can, in some cases, be an effective 
means of increasing the sustainable yield. In principle, the cost function could be adjusted 
to meet the revenue curve at the MSY, as depicted by TCMSY in Figure 6.2. But again, 
this is a haphazard technique that aims to achieve a purely biologically oriented goal by 
deliberately instituting economic inefficiency. Thus, it is futile to try to fulfil any long- 







Figure 6.2: Adjustment in the cost curve of a regulated fishery. After Clark (1990). 
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C.       TAXES AND ROYALTIES 
Financial disincentives have long been advanced as the simplest and most direct 
method of capturing rent from common fishery resources. However, the employment of 
taxes on a per catch basis has been minimal at best. There is little doubt that landings 
taxes offer greater promise as a regulatory device than the physical constraints previously 
discussed. Clearly they also affect each user's incentive to exploit fishery resources, but 
they do so without forcing operators to adopt inefficient means. Simply put, fewer 
fishermen would be willing to participate in the market. The more efficient producers 
would remain and they would be more cognizant of their production levels. (Clark, 1990; 
Anderson, 1977) 
Since the profit-maximizing producers must pay this tax, they would use new total 
cost curves in determining the desired effort level. This representation is similar to the 
cost increase depicted in Figure 6.1. To see the effect of a catch tax analytically, adjust 
the basic model's profit equation to reflect a tax of T, 
n(x,E,X)  = (p-x)h(t)-c(E)-E(t)  = [{p - X)q • x(t) - c(E)]E(t)       (6.1) 
Maximization of the new rent function implies that 
~ = (p-x)-q-x(t)  - c(E)  = 0 
dE 
c\E) = (p-x)'q-x(t) (6-2) 
Thus, effort is clearly a decreasing function of the tax rate 
If the tax exceeds the sale price (T ^ p), effort would cease. (Clark, 1990) 
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The reasoning behind this is simple. Profit minded producers compare their private 
gains per unit of effort with their marginal cost of this effort. They completely neglect the 
effect their effort has on the revenue of other operators in the fishery. The tax reduces the 
revenues received by an individual operator, potentially making them more comparable 
to the marginal revenue of effort for the entire fishery. This modified marginal revenue 
is compared to the marginal cost of effort when making production decisions. As with 
physical controls, the perceived cost curve in this case could theoretically be adjusted to 
any desired effort level. The total cost curve in the presence of the optimal tax is reflected 
by TCMEY in Figure 6.2. In this case, the bionomic equilibrium coincides with the point 
of maximum fishery profits. Of course, all of this profit would accrue to the tax-collecting 
authority. (Clark, 1985; Anderson, 1977) 
The fact that the users still receive zero rent makes the imposition of catch taxes 
extremely unpopular with the fishing industry. The common misconception is that the 
enterprise would be profitable without the duty. Not surprisingly, regulation by taxation 
has seldom received serious consideration. However, there is one chief difficulty 
associated with the taxation strategy. Calculating of the optimal duty would require the 
central authority to know the operating cost structure of each producer, as well as the 
biological attributes of the fish population. A very demanding task in a variable world. 
The optimal tax would have to be recomputed and relegislated on a continual basis. 
(Clark, 1990; Anderson, 1977) 
In conclusion, while taxation holds little appeal to the commercial fisherman, it 
does affect the level of effort without adversely affecting efficiency. When taxes are used 
properly, resource rents can be captured for the benefit of the taxing authority and 
subsequently society; not lost because users were forced to use inefficient methods. 
Although economic rents can be optimized, the question remains whether economic 
efficiency can be achieved without taking the profits of the individual fisherman. 
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D.       LIMITED ENTRY VIA VESSEL/OWNER LICENSES 
Like with physical constraints and landing taxes, vessel licenses also increase costs 
to the individual fisherman. And in fact, most nations license one or a combination of 
inputs to their fisheries, including fishermen, vessels, tonnage of vessels, units of gear, 
etc. However, these user fees are typically nominal. Licenses are often granted to all 
citizens who apply. Licensing is seldom used as a management tool in regulating a 
fishery's capacity. Such cases represent an obvious movement away from open-access 
fishing and towards exclusive property rights. As with the control measures noted 
throughout this chapter, the concept of displaced resources remains a chief concern. 
However, limited entry systems differ sharply from the preceding controls in that 
producers are pushed out of the fishery by an outside authority vice existing on their own 
accord. (Clark, 1985; Anderson, 1977) 
A few in the fishing industry, and a few authors continue to argue that limiting 
access to a fishery for fishermen, vessels, or both, would end the chronic problems of 
overcapitalization. They base their position on the errant belief that restricting the fleet 
size would generate the optimum harvest. However, simply restricting access to a finite 
number of entrants fails completely to consider the economic incentives that dominate 
common-property exploitation. While the level of effort would initially be reduced, profit 
minded fishermen would alter their operations in the long run to reflect the increase in 
stock productivity and the potential to gain added revenues. Producers would still find it 
profitable to invest in larger ships, additional and more efficient equipment, etc. (Clark, 
1990; Anderson, 1977) 
It has also been asserted that the capital removed from each licensee would inhibit 
subsequent expansion to some degree. This is especially true if license fees could be 
periodically adjusted to reflect the expected rents of each operator. Under such conditions, 
the fees would be essentially the same as taxes on effort. This could effectively extract 
economic rents from a fishery.   However, it is extremely improbable that license fees 
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would be able withdraw all profits from a particular fishery; hence, the motivation to 
expand production would persist. Unless license holders are somehow precluded from 
increasing their inputs, license limitations alone are unlikely to ensure economic 
efficiency. (Clark, 1980) 
Fishery managers typically try to impede the spiraling effort levels within limited 
access programs by incorporating physical constraints. Gear restrictions and seasonal 
closures are frequently enforced to prevent overfishing. Some economists maintain that 
such a system can be effective, if controls are sufficiently limiting, but many believe that 
constraints on any one component of effort are eventually offset by expanded effort in 
other areas. The predictable outcome would be a never ending body of regulations. In 
fact, the only difference between physical controls in conjunction with limited entry and 
physical controls in general is that there is a smaller operator population. Over the long 
run, limited entry and physical controls would only reduce fishing effort if the controls 
increase production costs by reducing efficiency.  (Clark, 1990; Anderson, 1977) 
The few attempts at limited entry programs appear to bear this out. Fishery 
managers constantly battle common-property users; effort constraints are continually being 
implemented and subsequently circumvented. For example, in the late 1960s the Canadian 
government introduced a licensing system to limit the number of vessels in its Pacific 
Coast salmon fleet. Total capacity increased shortly after implementing the fleet reduction 
program as fishermen replaced smaller older frigates with large trawlers. Administrators 
responded by limiting the total tonnage of fishing vessels. Producers then acquired more 
efficient gear and equipment. The game continues today. 
In another example, in the 1970s the Peruvian government limited access to reduce 
the excess capacity of its anchovy fleet. However, harvesting increased when operators 
introduced echo-sounders, fish pumps for more quickly transferring fish from the nets to 
the hold, and power blocks for improved net handling. Increased effort in response to new 
controls seems to be a common trait of biologically oriented measures that disregard the 
common resource problem in basic fishery economics. (Clark, 1990; Anderson, 1977) 
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E.       TOTAL QUOTA SYSTEM 
In many respects, total unallocated catch quotas act like seasonal closures, at least 
over the short-term. The length and timing of seasonal restrictions are commonly based 
on a regulatory agency's view of the amount of fish that should be harvested during a 
given period. In other words, closures are simply an indirect means of instituting a total 
quota. Unfortunately, quota systems are not exempt from the problems facing seasonal 
policies. Fish populations can fluctuate for reasons not connected with the level of fishing. 
The total allowable catch would have to be regularly adjusted to maintain the mortality rate 
at the desired level. Usually, an average annual quota is established. In a year when 
resources are scarce, stock abundance could fall to undesirably low levels. Similarly, total 
quotas introduce an incentive for more and bigger vessels to race for the limited amount 
of fish, until fishing is no longer a profitable investment. (Gulland, 1977) 
As noted, any success in reducing fishing costs or expanding revenues attracts 
additional effort. This would lead to shorter seasons, as quotas are met more rapidly, and 
increasingly inefficient operations by common-property users. Producers would keep 
striving to reduce the amount of time it takes to produce a unit of effort. This would 
increase unit costs. This race against time would continue until the total cost of the effort 
required to catch the quota equals the total revenue. Theoretically the proper catch would 
be taken in each period, but the expense of doing so is certainly not minimized. It is 
unlikely that any long-term economic objectives could be fulfilled by using of a single 
unallocated quota. (Anderson, 1977; Gulland, 1977) 
Mathematically, the total catch quota system is relatively simple. In an 
overexploited fishery, the quota must be set at an artificially low level to permit stock 
rehabilitation. Eventually, the fish population would recover to the maximum economic 
yield or maximum sustainable yield, depending on the regulatory agency's objective. The 
total allowable harvest would then be raised to match that catch. Returning to the basic 
fishery model presented in Chapter IV, the model can be modified by adding a constraint 
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yv < Q     (/>o) 
T   ,J ' (6.4) 
(/ + 1)7- 
',=    /*.""W* (6.5) 
jT 
where Qj represents the total allowable catch for period jand Y ydenotes the ith fisherman's 
total harvest in that period. The individual producers' problem is then to maximize their 
profit such that for N equivalent fishermen 
EXt) { 
max ifYY    <Q 
J
 T   '; (6-6) 
otherwise 
In a perfect world with perfect information, the total allowable catch scheme could be used 
to prevent the stock biomass from being harvested below the point of MEY (or MSY). 
However, without further limitations on effort and entry, the fishery would become 
overcapitalized, tending towards an equilibrium where returns equal costs. The effect 
would be to replace overfishing with overcapacity. Since producers disregard their effect 
on the fish population and on the time of closure, this problem cannot be treated as an 
optimal control exercise. The commercial fisherman's only choice is to determine the 
level of capitalization. (Clark, 1980) 
The competitive Nash solution can be determined via response functions. Figure 
6.3 displays the reaction curves (fo for two equivalent producers. The Nash solution is at 
point Q. For more than two equivalent producers (N > 2), response surfaces can be 
calculated as follows: 
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C = *(EO (6.7) 
The Nash solution EN satisfies the following: 
lim NEXI - E' N 
V-.00 
(6.8) 
where E" is the amount of total capacity that inhibits added effort and further entry into 
the fishery. (Clark, 1980) 
max Ei 
Figure 6.3:  Response functions for a total quota system.  The Nash solution for two 
producers is at point Q. From Clark (1980). 
A combined limited-entry, total allowable catch program could generate positive 
profits, as with the British Columbia salmon fishery. However, equilibrium is at a 
suboptimal level with profits approaching zero as the number of producers increases. 
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Unquestionably, a classic stand-alone, total catch quota system would simply promote 
biological aspirations. It would not preserve profits or encourage efficiency. (Clark, 
1990; Clark, 1980) 
F.        ALLOCATED QUOTA SYSTEM 
An allocated quota can also control removal rates. While many of the biological 
obstacles persist, the prospects for economic efficiency are much greater with this strategy. 
The unallocated approach forces producers to compete for a share of the total harvest. 
Allocated quotas allow common resource users who own a personal quota to satisfy the 
quota at an efficient pace. With individual quotas, vessel operators are free to take their 
share whenever and however they prefer. The drive to reduce expenses and maximize 
profits would lead to orderly harvesting practices. Likewise, decisions to the adopt 
technological advancements would not be hastily influenced by the decisions of other 
operators nor inhibited by physical constraints. These decisions would depend on the 
ability to maximize long-term economic rents. Of course, an allotted quota scheme must 
be accompanied by some form of limited entry, either by restricting entry or by limiting 
the total number of allocated quotas. Without restricting the participants or total quotas, 
individual quotas would act like total catch quotas; serving absolutely no economic 
purpose. (Clark, 1985) 
The impact of an allocated catch quota can be modeled by replacing Equation 6.4 
with the constraint 
7, < Qt (i = l,2,...,N;J*0) (69) 
where N (fixed) denotes the total number of allowances to be allocated. Therefore, the 
individual producer now faces the constrained optimization problem 
max TC.(x,£.) = pgxE. - cE. (6.10) 
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subject to Equation 6.9. The result of an individual catch quota is plainly evident. Each 
producer's capacity level (Emax) is essentially independent of optimal capacity of other 
common-property users, such that 
Eft) 
(       0 
if Y.. < Q 
otherwise 
(6.11) 
The Nash solution for two producers can be represented by using response functions as 
illustrated in Figure 6.4. (Clark, 1980) 
max Ei 
max Ei 
Figure 6.4: Response functions for allocated quota system. The Nash solution for two 
producers is at point Q. From Clark (1980). 
Furthermore, individual quotas, like licenses, may or may not be transferable. 
Transferable allowances are more appealing from an economic standpoint. Some operators 
are more efficient than others.    Quotas would be more valuable to more efficient 
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operators. These operators would outbid others for the right to harvest. Correspondingly, 
less efficient producers would be induced to exit the fishery. They could capitalize on 
their departure by selling their catch quotas. New fishermen would only be drawn to the 
fishery if they were more efficient than existing producers. Since economic self-interest 
would tend to prevail, a transferable allocated quota program would optimize efficiency 
for existing ships and the introduction of new vessels. (Clark, 1990) 
In some sense, transferable allocated quotas are equivalent to catch taxes. This 
equivalence can be seen by rewriting the profit function in Equation 6.10 in terms of the 
stock population and the yield harvested. 
max 7t.(jc,7.)  = pY   - c— (6,12) 
'qx 
An individual fisherman would profit from purchasing additional quotas if and only if the 
marginal gain in net revenue from the added capacity exceeded the cost. Letting m denote 
the cost of quotas, a producer would acquire more quotas as long as 
oil 
'<X'Q) > m (6.13) 67 
Conversely, an owner would market quotas when 
ÖTÜ. 
L(x,Q) < m (6.14) 
07 
Thus, the individual user's demand function for quotas, D; = D;(m, x), is: 
Ö7I. 
07 
'-(x,Q) - m (6 15) 
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Explicitly, this produces 
D. 
<(—)  = (p-m)qx (6.16) 
qx 




> 0 (6.18) 
Ox 
Likewise, it follows that 
dm   =   -(ÖD/Öx)  > 0 (6 19) 
6x (6Z)/6m) 
Stated non-analytically, the demand for quotas decreases as fishing costs increase and the 
fishing stock decreases. Higher population levels imply that quotas become more valuable 
as the costs of capture decline. (Clark, 1990) 
The total demand for quotas can be expressed as a function of the stock population 
and the price of a quota: 
D(x,m) = XI  D.(x,m) (6.20) 
The market-clearing price for quotas can then be determined from of the supply-demand 
equilibrium condition: 
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D(x,m) = Q (6.21) 
When quantity of quotas supplied and demanded are equal, i.e., the quota market has been 
cleared, then Y> = Qj = Dj and Equation 6.16 becomes 
c('(E)  = (p-m)qx (6.22) 
Comparing Equation 6.22 and Equation 6.2, the equivalence of catch taxes and catch 
quotas is readily obvious. 
c.'{E)  = (p-m)qx  = (p~l)qx (6.23) 
A landings tax of x has the same impact on the fishing effort as a transferable quota with 
a price of m. However, a tax is a direct expense for producers. It actually reduces the 
price received for their catch. A transferable quota represents an opportunity cost to 
producers. They could have sold their individual rights. A transferable allocated quota 
system can reduce the cost to the operators if the quotas are initially distributed to the 
operators. If the operators are required to purchase the quotas from the regulatory agency, 
the operators loses will be the same under the quota and tax systems. In theory, a 
regulatory authority could set the total supply of allocated quotas at the point of MEY. 
This would generate the quota price that maximizes profits and economic efficiency. 
(Clark, 1990; Clark, 1985) 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Many economists and marine biologists agree that managing the world's fisheries 
is becoming increasingly critical. The imbalance is growing between the capacity of the 
world's fishing fleets and the availability of common-property fishery resources. The 
development and introduction of long-range fishing fleets and sweeping improvements in 
fishing techniques, processing, and marketing have alarmingly increased the worldwide 
harvest. This document has presented the theoretical framework surrounding common- 
property renewable fishery resources and analytically examined specific regulations for 
curbing today's predominate inefficiencies. Although drafted as no more than an 
elementary analysis, the results still appear to be rather significant. 
The fundamental reason why fisheries need to be managed is their common- 
property nature. This makes the fishing industry much harder to govern than other 
industries. It lacks the property-right delineations common in other enterprises. A general 
theme that has carried through most fishery management endeavors is an inordinate 
emphasis on controlling fishing effort by means that preserve the resource's common- 
property nature. In reviewing the management schemes in Chapter VI, only one 
regulatory measure, catch taxes, essentially dissuades using excessive amounts of capital 
and labor and protects the resource from overexploitation while allowing producers 
maximum freedom to function in a free enterprise fashion. Unfortunately, the proper use 
of such taxes has long been opposed by the politically powerful fishing industry. On the 
whole, they favor constraints that permit them free access to the fishery and can be easily 
sidestepped, such as equipment constraints. In other words, they favor those measures that 
offer no effective long-term solution. 
To quell the voices of the environmentalists, exploiters of common-property fishery 
resources have pushed for legislation they find most beneficial. For obvious reasons, 
individual fishermen oppose landings taxes.    The conventional methods of fishery 
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management, such as total catch quotas, gear restrictions, seasonal and area closures, etc., 
appear to address biological concerns and are the least disdained by the fishing industry. 
However, token efforts of this kind have no economic basis and completely bypass 
property-rights, the heart of the problem. These approaches inevitably breed economic 
distortions which induce further increases in capacity and render control of the resources 
progressively more difficult. Unfortunately, most fishery controls are passed only with 
the fishing industry's approval. They are yet to advocate restrictions that exclude 
fishermen from a fishery, even recognizing the overcapitalization and overfishing 
attributable to the common-property nature of the resource. Restricted access is 
particularly controversial because once producers exit, additional profit accrues to the 
survivors. 
It is readily apparent from the analysis in Chapter V that the incentives to dissipate 
economic rents under competitive conditions cannot be overcome by the conventionally 
accepted control methods. These regulations fail to achieve economically optimal 
exploitation. In fact, only two techniques, taxes on catch and a combination of limited- 
entry and allocated quotas, appear to offer any promise of effectively thwarting this 
inducement. Owing to political opposition to taxation, common-property users may be 
compelled to affix rights (or proxies for rights) to fishery resources. Outside sole 
ownership, transferable allocated quotas are most capable of achieving the optimal 
allocation of effort. These quotas bestow resource rights to the quota holder. Sacrificing 
free and open access to fishery resources may be a necessary evil to efficiently use capital 
and labor, and deliver products to the consumer at the lowest price possible. 
The future of commercial fishing lies in its ability to live within its resource 
boundaries. The fishing industry can achieve this goal using allocated quotas if fishermen 
can embrace the concept of sustainability; realizing that they own a valuable renewable 
resource. The use of allocated catch quotas will provide managers with a sufficient array 
of tools to directly tackle most of the current problems, but more emphasis needs to be 
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placed on controlling effort before overcapitalization occurs. Proposals to reduce the catch 
after stocks have become vulnerable to fishing pressure are often met with strong 
resistance. Most producers cannot endure even a short-term harvest reduction. An 
allocated quota approach should therefore prevent excess effort, vice simply restoring 
depleted fisheries. In this respect, fishery management and development should be 
considered as interacting aspects of the same process. Individual catch quotas are a 
relatively new concept for fishery management. Thus, there is little data available 
concerning their consequences. However, they seem to offer the most practical hope for 
economic efficiency. As experience with carefully designed and managed quota programs 
grows, more fisheries will likely brought under this form of management. 
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